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Corporate Anti-Corruption Disclosure: An Examination of the Impact of  
Media Exposure and Country-Level Press Freedom 
 
Introduction 
 
As noted by Cho et al. (2015), numerous studies over the past 30 years,1 often based on 
arguments from legitimacy theory, document that companies tend to use social and 
environmental disclosure as a way of responding to social and political pressure. Patten (1991) 
explains this relation by arguing that where companies face greater exposures, they have an 
incentive to project an image of awareness and action (although that may not be supported with 
underlying performance – see, e.g., Patten, 2005, as well as the discussion in the conclusion 
section that follows).  Within the broader range of legitimacy theory-based studies, a growing 
number of investigations explore the role that media coverage plays with respect to corporate 
environmental disclosure (e.g., Aerts and Cormier, 2009; Brown and Deegan, 1998; Dawkins 
and Fraas, 2011).  The examinations consistently tend to support the argument that greater media 
exposure, particularly with respect to articles reflecting an unfavorable view toward the company 
or its industry, is positively associated with the extent of disclosure.  An unexplored issue to 
date, however, is whether media exposure related to other specific types of social issues similarly 
induces more extensive disclosure within the targeted firms. Ashforth et al. (2008), Hess and 
Ford (2008), and others, claim that corporate corruption in the form of bribery, money 
laundering, and other illicit activities has evolved into a major social issue world-wide, and, 
accordingly, in this study we focus on the relation between media exposure regarding corporate 
corruption and companies’ anti-corruption disclosures.      
 More important than merely extending legitimacy theory and media exposure arguments 
to a differing disclosure area, however, in this investigation we explore how country-level press 
freedom influences both corporate anti-corruption disclosure and the relation between media 
exposure and the provision of anti-corruption information.  Several recent studies (e.g., Brunetti 
and Weder, 2003; Freille et al., 2007; Camaj, 2013) provide evidence that where press freedom 
is reduced, governmental corruption is higher, although none of these specifically examines 
impacts on corporate behavior.  We argue that where press freedom is restricted and corruption is 
more common, the general level of social and political pressures related to the corporate 
corruption issues are likely reduced, and as such, we anticipate companies headquartered in such 
countries would see less need for disclosures related to anti-corruption efforts.  Further, we assert 
that, in countries where press freedom is constrained, the media may be perceived as less of a 
threat to induce social or political exposures, and as such, we expect firms headquartered within 
those countries to see less need for legitimating disclosures even when they are the target of 
media articles.   
 For our investigation, we rely on Transparency International’s ratings of the anti-
corruption disclosures by the largest 105 multinational firms in the world (Kowalczyk-Hoyer, 
2012) and Reporters Without Borders’ 2011-2012 rankings of country-level press freedom.2  We 
                                                 
1 Cho et al. (2015, p. 20) cite, for example, Cowen et al. (1987), Patten (1991), Holder-Webb et al. (2009), and Cho 
et al. (2012), among others. 
2 Available at (http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2011-2012,1043.html).  Subsequent to completion of our initial 
analysis (on 5 November 2014), TI released a follow-up to the 2012 report.  However, because the 2012 report was 
the first rating of corporations’ anti-corruption disclosures, we believe it serves as the best choice for our analysis.  
As a sensitivity test on the strength of our relations, we used the 2014 scores (allowing for a lagged impact).  Results 
(non-tabulated) were consistent with those reported below using the 2012 scores. 
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also calculate media coverage measures capturing the existence and the extent of media exposure 
based on a search of the world’s major media outlets using the Dow Jones Factiva database.  
Controlling for other firm-specific factors potentially impacting anti-corruption disclosure 
choices, we find that media exposure (using either the existence or the extensiveness metric) is 
positively associated with anti-corruption disclosure scores while country-level press freedom 
(based on where sample companies are headquartered) is also positively related to the disclosure.  
Further, we find that higher (lower) levels of press freedom increase (reduce) the impact of 
media exposure on the sample companies’ anti-corruption disclosures.  Consistent with Dobler et 
al.’s (2015) investigation of environmental disclosure, we also document that these relations are 
robust to inclusion of financial control variables (see, e.g., Clarkson et al., 2008). Finally, we 
identify other country-level factors that could potentially affect corporate anti-corruption 
disclosure and document that, although all of the measures are highly correlated with our press 
freedom metric, none explains as much variation in anti-corruption disclosure as does press 
freedom.  Further, results for our primary variables continue to hold for models including each of 
the other country-level measures as an additional control. 
 Our findings extend current research by documenting the role that media exposure plays 
in specific corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure outside of the environmental domain, 
as well as providing evidence that country-level press freedom, a factor not previously examined, 
influences that impact.  In addition to adding to the understanding of what drives CSR 
disclosure, however, our results also appear to call into question arguments, such as those by 
Transparency International (TI), that corporate reporting on anti-corruption issues can play an 
important role in reducing corruption practices (also see, e.g., Halter et al., 2009; Hess, 2009).  
TI argues that disclosure “is an indication of commitment, awareness, and action,” and that firms 
with better reporting “are more likely to be part of the solution than the problem” (Kowalczyk-
Hoyer, 2012, p. 4).  Our findings instead suggest that disclosure is a function of differences in 
the social exposure firms face, and, given corporate environmental disclosure research indicating 
that disclosure and performance are not always positively associated (see, e.g., Aerts and 
Cormier, 2009; Cho and Patten, 2007; Cho et al., 2012), it is at least questionable whether 
companies’ anti-corruption disclosures truly reflect commitment, awareness, and action.  At a 
minimum, future investigations of the disclosure-performance relation with respect to corporate 
anti-corruption efforts would appear to be warranted.  We begin with background on the issue of 
corporate corruption and CSR disclosure, followed by the methods, results, and conclusion. 
 
Background and Hypothesis Development 
 Hess and Ford (2008, p. 312) note that, in spite of considerable international efforts to 
curb corruption,3 “corporations’ payment of bribes continues as a common business practice.”  In 
support of this claim, KPMG Forensic’s Integrity Survey 2013 indicates that seven percent of 
their respondents with government and regulatory affairs functions reported they had observed 
improper payments or bribes to foreign officials while nine percent claimed first-hand 
knowledge of business with third parties potentially involved in money laundering (KPMG 
Forensics, 2013).  Corporate corruption is not benign as, according to TI, it “inhibits free markets 
and undermines the stability vital to successful economies,” while also enabling the flow of 
                                                 
3 These include legislative enactments such as the U.S.’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Bribery Act of 2010 
in the U.K., as well as broader initiatives including the United Nations Global Compact which in 2005 added a tenth 
principle on corporate corruption.  
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enormous amounts of illicit money (Kowalczyk-Hoyer, 2012, p. 4).  As such, it has become a 
major issue of social exposure needing to be addressed by corporations across the world, and, 
related to our analysis, Wang and Rosenau (2001, p. 30) argue the increased ability of media to 
investigate and report on corruption has helped to foster the increased “salience of corruption on 
the global agenda.”4 
 A considerable body of research over the past quarter-century relies on legitimacy theory 
to explore how companies choose to respond to social and political exposures through the use of 
information disclosure.  Suchman (1995, p. 574) defines legitimacy as “a generalized perception 
or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.”  Patten (1991; 1992) 
further argues that social legitimacy is monitored through the public policy process as opposed to 
the marketplace.5  As such, where firms face social and political pressures, they have incentives 
to take actions to reduce that exposure and one of the ways they can do this is through disclosure.  
As summarized by Deegan (2014, pp. 257-258), companies facing threats to their legitimacy can 
use disclosure in an attempt to inform their “relevant publics” of changes in the companies’ 
performance relative to the social issue or to change their opinions of that performance either by 
changing outside expectations for what companies ought to be doing or by focusing on more 
positive aspects of performance relative to the issue at hand.6 Related to this point, Deegan 2014) 
further notes that, from a stakeholder theory perspective, the relative power of different 
stakeholder groups can be expected to influence the degree of social pressure they bring to bear 
on companies with respect to social issues.7 
Numerous studies support the legitimacy theory arguments by showing that differences in 
the levels of social and/or environmental disclosures appear to be related to differences in social 
and political exposure (see, e.g., Cho et al., 2015; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Patten et al., 2015), 
and that changes in those exposures appear to influence changes in the provision of CSR 
information (see, e.g., Heflin and Wallace, 2015; Patten, 2000; and Walden and Schwartz, 1997).  
Given the rise in societal concern with corruption, we anticipate that corporations may similarly 
use disclosure to highlight their anti-corruption efforts. 
 Within the body of legitimacy theory-based work, a growing number of studies adopt 
media agenda setting theory to explain how media coverage, presumably by increasing social 
exposures, influences corporate disclosure of CSR information.8  Brown and Deegan (1998, p. 
25) note that: 
 
 Media agenda setting theory posits a relationship between the relative emphasis given 
 by the media to various topics and the degree of salience these topics have for the general 
 public (Ader, 1995, p. 300).  In terms of causality, increased media attention is believed 
 to lead to increased community concern for a given issue.  The media are not seen as 
                                                 
4 As argued by Everett et al. (2007), the issue of accounting’s role in fighting (or engendering) corruption has also 
received considerable attention from what they refer to as both the orthodox and radical perspectives. 
5 Although social and political exposures can still be relevant to investors (see, e.g., Bowen et al., 1983; Blacconiere 
and Patten, 1994).  
6 Deegan (2014) credits Lindblom (1993) for laying out the potential legitimating uses of corporate CSR disclosure. 
7 Deegan (2014, pp. 251-252) asserts that legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory are overlapping as opposed to 
discrete theories, where the latter is more focused on how “corporate disclosure is a strategy for managing, or 
perhaps manipulating, the demands of particular groups.” 
8 Not all studies exploring media exposure’s impact on CSR disclosure rely on media agenda setting theory.  See, for 
example, Bewley and Li (2000) and Rupley et al. (2012). 
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 mirroring public priorities; rather, they are seen as shaping them. 
 
In turn, according to Brown and Deegan (1998, p. 26), legitimacy theory predicts that companies 
will respond to the media-driven increased social concern with higher levels of social 
disclosure.9      
 Most of the published studies explicitly examining the impact of media exposure on CSR 
disclosure focus on its relation to the provision of environmental information.  For example, 
Brown and Deegan (1998) explore environmental disclosure by Australian firms and measure 
media exposure as the number of published press articles citing environmental issues broken 
down across nine separate industry groups.  They report a significant relation between the 
number of unfavorable articles and the extent of positive environmental disclosures.  From a 
different perspective, Deegan et al. (2000) test for changes in environmental disclosure in 
response to five separate environmental disasters and document that in the four cases where the 
catastrophe received substantial media coverage, environmental disclosure increased 
significantly.  Focusing on a sample of U.S. companies, Patten (2002a) investigates whether 
media coverage associated with the first-time release of Toxics Release Inventory pollution data 
to the public influenced subsequent changes in environmental disclosure.  He documents that 
companies receiving specific media exposure (Alcoa and chemical companies within the sample) 
exhibited even larger increases in environmental disclosure than other sample companies.  Both 
Bewley and Li (2000) and Aerts and Cormier (2009) more explicitly measure media exposure for 
individual companies by identifying the number of environmentally-themed press articles 
published about each of the companies in their respective samples, and both report significant 
positive relations between their media metric and the extent of environmental disclosure.  
Finally, Dawkins and Fraas (2011) focus more specifically on voluntary climate change 
disclosures and document a significant positive relation between the number of climate change-
related articles including specific mention of firms and their subsequent climate change 
disclosure. 
 In contrast to the studies focusing on only environmental disclosure, Deegan et al. (2002), 
Branco and Rodrigues (2008), and Islam and Deegan (2010) all examine the impact of media 
exposure relative to a broader set of CSR disclosures.  Deegan et al. (2002) investigate media 
coverage of CSR issues for the Australian firm BHP Ltd over the period from 1983 through 
1997, and they report that, overall, higher numbers of CSR-related articles in a given year were 
positively associated with greater disclosure, but within general categories, only environmental 
and human resource disclosures showed a significant relation to their media measure.10 However, 
in tests of the relation between unfavorable news coverage and positive CSR disclosures, Deegan 
et al. report statistically significant associations in total and across all general areas examined.  
Investigating a sample of Portuguese companies, Branco and Rodrigues (2008) measure media 
exposure as the number of CSR-themed articles published about sample companies and find a 
positive association with annual report CSR disclosure.  Finally, Islam and Deegan (2010) focus 
on two high profile multinational clothing and sports retail firms – Nike, based in the U.S., and 
                                                 
9 Brown and Deegan further note Zucker’s (1978) argument that media influence increases where the public has less 
direct exposure to the issue, and as such, must rely on media sources for information.  This would appear to be the 
case with respect to issues of corporate corruption.   
 
10 More specific items of disclosure within other general themes including, for example, energy conservation awards 
and company donations also showed significant positive association with media coverage. 
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Sweden’s Hennes & Mauritz.  Islam and Deegan’s media exposure metric is based on the 
number of negative-toned articles published globally about CSR issues within the firms’ primary 
industry.  Examining the period from 1987 through 2005, the authors find a significant positive 
association between the extent of negative media coverage in one year and the level of total CSR 
disclosure in the next.  Islam and Deegan further document that the majority of both general 
categories and specific items of disclosure also show significant relations to prior-year media 
exposure.   
 Overall, prior studies appear to consistently support the argument that greater media 
exposure leads to higher levels of CSR disclosure.  Based on this prior evidence, we argue that, 
because corruption is also a salient social issue, greater media exposure with respect to 
corruption issues serves to increase the specific social and political exposures of targeted firms.  
Based on legitimacy theory, we in turn expect those companies facing media exposure to 
respond with higher levels of anti-corruption disclosure.  Accordingly, we state our first 
hypothesis as: 
  
 H1: Ceteris paribus, higher levels of media exposure will be positively associated with 
 corporate anti-corruption disclosures. 
 
 While the studies summarized above indicate that media exposure influences the 
provision of corporate CSR information, all of the investigations focus on companies 
headquartered in countries with relatively high press freedom.11  Unfortunately, the freedom that 
the press has with respect to investigation and reporting varies considerably across the world 
(Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Freille et al., 2007) and this in turn likely leads to differences in the 
power that the media and the general public as outside stakeholder groups will have with respect 
to bringing pressures to bear on companies.  Where press freedom is relatively strong, media can 
be expected to help reduce levels of corruption.  Camaj (2013, pp. 22-23) notes that the “media 
have the potential to help the prosecutorial institutions by investigating and reporting instances 
of corruption.”  More specifically, Brunetti and Weber (2003, p. 1805) argue that press freedom 
“may be a particularly effective institution to fight collusive corruption where client and 
bureaucrat have a mutual interest in the corrupt act” (as would be the case in many types of 
corporate corruption).  Further, Camaj notes Stapenhurst’s (2000) assertion that media also 
indirectly aids in the battle against corruption by fostering a broader social climate and a 
heightened sense of accountability.  However, where press freedom is restricted, the power of the 
media to investigate and report on instances of corruption, including corporate acts, is reduced, 
and Chowdhury (2004), Freille et al. (2007), Treisman (2007), and Camaj (2013) all present 
evidence supporting the claim that lower press freedom leads to greater corruption at the country 
level. Based on this evidence, we argue that where press freedom is reduced and corruption is 
more prevalent, corporations face lower levels of more general social exposure in relation to 
corruption issues than where press freedom is high.  Following from legitimacy theory 
arguments, therefore, corporations headquartered in countries with lower press freedom will face 
less pressure to report on corruption efforts.  As such we state our second hypothesis as: 
 
 H2: Ceteris paribus, country-level press freedom will be positively related to corporate  
 anti-corruption disclosure.  
                                                 
11 Reporters Without Borders’ 2011-2012 rankings of country-level press freedom place Australia, Canada, the 
United States and Sweden all within the top-third of countries rated. 
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 Finally, in addition to, or perhaps as a result of, the reduced social pressures where 
country-level press freedom is lower, we also expect media exposure to have less impact on 
corporate anti-corruption disclosure choice in those domains.  Lindstedt and Naurin (2010, p. 
316), based on the results of their investigation of citizen education, media reporting, and 
corruption through electoral democracy, argue that “making information available will not 
prevent corruption if the conditions for publicity and accountability are weak.”  When press 
freedom is limited, these conditions are indeed more likely to be weak, and as such, we expect 
that corporate management of companies headquartered in such countries will perceive specific 
media exposure as less likely to influence social pressures on the companies, and as such, will be 
perceived as less of a legitimacy threat than is the case where press freedom is higher. 
Accordingly, we expect media exposure to have a reduced effect on anti-corruption disclosure in 
these settings.  Our final hypothesis is formally stated as: 
 
 H3: Ceteris paribus, media exposure will have less influence on corporate anti- 
corruption disclosure where country-level press freedom is lower. 
 
Methods 
 
Sample 
 
 We base our sample on TI’s 2012 rating of transparency in corporate reporting 
(Kowalczyk-Hoyer, 2012).  TI’s study focuses on the 105 largest publicly traded multinational 
corporations (based on market value), and in addition to providing assessments on the disclosure 
of country-by-country data and organizational transparency, provides ratings on the level of anti-
corruption information provided by the firms up through 15 October 2011.12  The sample 
companies range in size (based on market value in U.S. dollars) from $50.25 billion to $333.84 
billion with a mean (median) of $106.20 billion ($83.36 billion).  The sample includes 
companies headquartered in 23 different countries with the highest representation coming from 
the U.S. (39 companies).  TI classifies the companies across nine different industry sectors,13 the 
largest portion of which comes from the financials industry (24 companies).   
 
Anti-Corruption Disclosure 
 
 We use TI’s ratings of anti-corruption disclosure as our dependent variable.  The 2012 
report is an outgrowth of TI’s continuing program to foster transparency in corporate reporting, 
that includes, for example, prior reports on revenue transparency in the oil and gas industry (see, 
e.g., TI, 2008).14  According to Kowalczyk-Hoyer (2012), TI reviewed all documents publicly 
available through the companies’ websites and assessed disclosure across a 13-item metric based 
on its own “Business Principles for Countering Bribery.”  Using a content analysis approach, TI 
scored disclosures for each item as zero if no information for the item was included.  Where 
                                                 
12 The list of companies is available in Kowalczyk-Hoyer (2012, pp. 52-54). 
13 The sectors are basic materials, consumer goods & services, financials, health care, industrials, oil & gas, 
technology, telecommunication, and utilities.   
14 Both Aggarwal and Goodell (2013) and Healy and Serafeim (2016) rely on assessments of corporate disclosure by 
TI, although neither explicitly uses only the anti-corruption measures from the 2012 report.      
7 
 
companies made disclosures related to specific items, TI scored the disclosures as either 0.5 or 1 
depending on the nature of the information provided.  Appendix A presents the 13 disclosure 
areas as well as TI’s process for scoring across each of the items.  Final scores were stated as a 
percentage of the total possible points.  Overall, the percentage scores ranged from zero (three 
companies) to 100 (three companies) with a mean (median) of 68 (77).   
 
Media Exposure 
 
  For the purposes of our study, we consider media exposure as a firm-specific source of 
increased social and political exposure.  We identify ‘media exposure’ as the existence of press 
articles related to corruption that specifically mention one or more of our sample companies.  To 
find these articles, we relied on the Dow Jones Factiva database and performed a search using a 
number of key words related to corruption15 and each of our sample company names.16  We 
limited the search to the one year period ending 15 October, 2011, the ending date for TI’s 
assessment of corporate disclosures. Overall, we identified a total of 1,622 articles and each of 
these was read by a member of the research team.  Our focus is on the role media pressure plays 
in corporate anti-corruption disclosure, and as such we limited our media exposure count to 
articles conveying a negative message with respect to the sample firms.  This included, for 
example, where companies were cited as having been guilty or suspected of paying bribes, 
accepting kickbacks, or otherwise engaging in potentially corrupt activities.  Savage et al. (2000) 
argue that it is adverse news reports (those reflecting negatively on a company’s activities) that 
potentially lead to legitimacy threats for organizations, and Dearing and Roger (1996) present 
evidence that negative media attention impacts public salience more so than positive media 
coverage.  Similarly, Rupley et al. (2012) document that only negative media exposure was 
associated with levels of voluntary environmental disclosure for their sample of U.S. firms.  
 Based on our assessment, we excluded 497 of the original articles leaving a total of 
1,165.  Overall, 58 of the sample companies were mentioned in negative news articles related to 
corruption issues, but the number varied substantially across companies.  The mean (median) 
number of corruption articles (based only on those companies with non-zero coverage) was 20.1 
(11.0), and covered a range from three to 124 separate articles per company.  For our analysis, 
we use two separate media exposure metrics.  First, we use a one/zero indicator variable to 
identify those sample companies with any published corruption-related articles over our period 
of assessment.  Second, and capturing differences in the level of press attention, we created a 
four-level categorical variable and classified firms based on the number of articles published 
about them.  However, because the number of articles was significantly associated with firm size 
(larger companies had higher article counts), we created our exposure categories based on size-
adjusted article counts.  We scored companies with no corruption articles as zero, those with 
articles, but whose adjusted article counts were at the median or lower as one, companies with 
adjusted article counts above the median but within three standard deviations of the mean as two, 
and companies with adjusted article counts more than three standard deviations from the overall 
                                                 
15 The key words used included ‘corruption’,’gifts’, ‘whistleblowing’, ‘donation’, ‘facilitation payment’, ‘bribe’, 
‘political contribution’, and ‘money laundering’. 
16 The Factiva data base covers more than 8,000 global publications including major press sources such as The New 
York Times, The Guardian, The Times, Far Eastern Economic Review, The Wall Street Journal, Shanghai Daily, 
and many others.  Factiva has also been used in other studies exploring media exposure issues (see, e.g., Brammer 
and Pavelin, 2008; Islam and Deegan, 2010). 
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mean as three.  The first measure captures whether the existence of media exposure influences 
the extent of anti-corruption disclosure, whereas the second identifies whether differences in the 
disclosure are associated with the level of the media exposure. 
 
Press Freedom 
 
 In addition to firm-specific media exposure, we argue that differences in country-level 
press freedom lead to differences in managerial perceptions of social and political exposure at a 
broader level.  As such, we anticipate that country-level press freedom will affect the degree of 
corporate anti-corruption disclosure.  To assess press freedom, we rely on the Press Freedom 
Index 2011-2012 developed by the non-governmental organization Reporters Without Borders 
(RWB).17  Based on an assessment of numerous factors associated with freedom of the press,18 
RWB provides a ranking of 179 different countries in terms of press freedom, where one 
represents the country with the highest press freedom and 179 the country with the lowest.  The 
2011-2012 index was based on an assessment period running from 1 December 2010 to 30 
November 2011.  We believe companies headquartered in countries with lower levels of press 
freedom will feel less pressure for anti-corruption disclosures, and we use the RWB ranking as 
our metric for the press freedom in each of our sample companies’ home country (the country 
where the company is headquartered).  The country press freedom rankings for our sample 
ranged from one to 174, with a mean ranking of 50.35. To aid in interpretation of results, we 
multiply the press freedom ranking by negative one.  Accordingly, we expect the coefficient on 
this parameter to be positively signed.  Because we also expect media exposure to create less 
pressure on companies based in countries with lower levels of press freedom, we also include an 
interaction term, Media*Press Freedom,19 to allow the impact of media exposure to vary across 
the press freedom rankings, and we expect this variable to be positively signed (media pressure 
influences disclosure more where press freedom is higher and less where it is lower). 
 
Controlling for Other Factors 
 
 Recognizing that other firm-specific factors could be expected to impact corporate 
choices with respect to anti-corruption disclosure, we introduce several control variables into our 
analysis.20  Our first control, ‘Industry Risk,’ captures differences in corruption risk across 
                                                 
17 RWB was founded in Montpellier (France) in 1985 by journalists Robert Ménard, Rémy Loury, Jacques Molénat 
and Émilien Jubineau. The organisation is registered in France as a non-profit organisation and has consultant status 
at the United Nations and UNESCO (http://en.rsf.org/who-we-are-12-09-2012,32617.html). 
 
18 According to information on the RWB website (http://en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/how_the_2011-
2012_index_was_compiled.pdf), the organization takes into consideration violations directly affecting journalists 
(including murders, imprisonment, physical attacks and threats) and the news media (censorship, confiscation of 
newspaper issues, searches and harassment), the level of self-censorship in each country and the ability of the media 
to investigate and criticize, the legal framework for the media (including penalties for press offences, the existence 
of a state monopoly for certain kinds of media and how the media are regulated) and the level of independence of 
the public media. It also reflects violations of the free flow of information on the Internet. 
19 The interaction variable is separately calculated using the appropriate media exposure metric in the respective 
models. 
20 We recognize that country-level factors could also be expected to impact companies’ anti-corruption disclosure 
and we address this issue in the results section below. 
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industry groups.  Healy and Serafeim (2016) note that companies from some industries are more 
likely to have interactions with governments relative to the sale of goods or services or other 
negotiations, and as such, face greater corruption risks.  TI, in its annual ‘Bribe Payers Index’, 
assesses the threat of corruption across different industry groups and we rely on their 2011 
report21 to identify industries facing greater risks at the time we focus on in this study.  More 
specifically, we use a one/zero classification variable and code firms in industries whose bribe 
payers’ rating score is below the sample mean (indicating a higher risk of corruption) as 
‘Industry Risk’ firms.  Overall, 37 of the 105 sample companies in this estimation are rated as 
being at higher risk of corruption. 
 Our second firm-level control variable, ‘Firm Size’, is based on findings in numerous 
studies of social and environmental disclosure that larger companies, presumably due to greater 
visibility, exhibit higher levels of disclosure (see, e.g., Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Hackston 
and Milne, 1996; Patten, 1991; 2002b).   We use market value data provided in the TI report 
(Kowalczyk-Hoyer, 2012) and take the natural log of the reported measure to control for 
concerns with heteroscedasticity.22 
 Finally, because differences in internal governance structures could be expected to 
influence companies’ anti-corruption disclosures, we include two firm-specific factors related to 
governance concerns.  The first of these is the presence of a corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
committee at the board of directors (BOD) level.  Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) argue that the 
presence of a CSR committee on the BOD may make the group more sensitive to CSR issues 
leading to increased transparency and higher levels of CSR disclosure.  Although Michelon and 
Parbonetti find only weak support for this relation in their empirical analysis, Kent and Monem 
(2008) report a significant positive relation between existence of an environmental committee on 
the BOD and the extensiveness of triple bottom line reporting for a sample of Australian firms.  
Prior studies (e.g., Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2012; Larkin et al., 2013; Michelon and Parbonetti, 
2012) also indicate that diversity with respect to the make-up of the BOD appears to influence 
CSR awareness and disclosure.  And while diversity can be defined in a variety of ways, gender 
is one of the most common (Larkin et al., 2013; Rao et al., 2012; van der Walt and Ingley, 2003), 
and accordingly, we measure BOD diversity as the percentage of the BOD made up of women 
directors.23  A considerable body of research in the social sciences suggests women may have 
higher standards of ethical behavior and be more concerned with the common good (Dollar et al., 
2001; Esarey and Chirillo, 2013), and higher female membership on the BOD has been shown to 
influence charitable giving (Wang and Coffey, 1992), CSR sensitivity (Bear et al., 2010), and 
environmental reporting (Rao et al., 2012), among other issues. We hand-collected CSR 
Committee and BOD membership data from sample companies’ annual reports, proxy 
statements, and websites.  We identified 32 of our sample companies as having a CSR 
Committee on the BOD, while, on average, women made up 17 percent of the membership, 
based on a range from zero to 43 percent. 
                                                 
21 Available at (http://bpi.transparency.org/bpi2011). 
22 Kowalczyk-Hoyer (2012) indicates that TI relied on market value data calculated by Forbes as of 1 March 2010.  
As a sensitivity check, we re-estimated the models using the log of total assets as of 12/31/2011.  Results, not 
presented here, were qualitatively unchanged from those using the market value measure. 
23 We also gathered data on the percentage of community influential members of the BOD (see Bear et al., 2010; 
Michelon and Parbonetti, 2013).  This alternative measure of diversity was significantly correlated with our gender 
measure, and results using this alternative measure, not presented here, were consistent with those reported in the 
paper. 
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   Overall, we state our regression model, with the sign of expected relations noted beneath 
each independent variable, as: 
 
 Disclosurei = a1 + B1Media Exposurei + B2Press Freedomi + B3Media*Press Freedomi + 
         (+)       (+)       (+) 
  B4Industry Riski + B5Firm Sizei + B6CSR Committeei + B7PercWomenBrdi 
              (+)              (+)     (+)          (+) 
 
Extended Model 
 
 Guidry and Patten (2012, p. 81), although focusing on the more limited issue of 
environmental disclosure, note that a growing number of investigations “adopt arguments from 
the economics-based voluntary disclosure theory (VDT) literature as justification for the 
inclusion of financial control variables in the explanatory models used.”24  Guidry and Patten 
argue that rather than being used to reduce information asymmetry with market participants, as 
assumed in VDT, social disclosures are instead used as a legitimating tool to reduce exposures to 
social and political pressures.  Guidry and Patten thus claim the use of financial control variables 
is not theoretically justified, and they document that a body of prior environmental disclosure 
studies employing such metrics presents, at best, mixed evidence of any significant impact.  
They also show that inclusion of VDT-based controls doesn’t alter the inferences from Cho and 
Patten’s (2007) study of the relation between environmental performance and environmental 
disclosure.  Dobler et al. (2015), also examining environmental disclosure, similarly find that 
inclusion of financial control variables did not change results on their primary variables of 
interest.  However, given Guidry and Patten’s (2012) acknowledgement that research to date on 
these relations is limited and that we are exploring an alternative form of social disclosure, we 
follow Dobler et al. (2015) and estimate an extended model that includes financial control 
variables.  Relying on Clarkson et al. (2008, p. 314), we include return on assets (ROA), 
leverage, and financing variables in our extended analysis, and each is measured following their 
methods.25 Clarkson et al. (2008) posit that each of the financial controls should be positively 
associated with levels of voluntary disclosure.  
   
Results 
 
 Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics for the metrics used in this study, while Table 2 
provides correlation measures.  Parametric correlations (Pearson product-moment correlations) 
are presented above the diagonal with non-parametric (Spearman’s rho) correlations below.  A 
review of the correlation statistics indicates that, at the bivariate level, neither media exposure 
variable is significantly associated with anti-corruption disclosure scores.  However, as expected, 
there is a statistically significant positive relation (at p < .01 using either parametric or non-
parametric correlation measures) between Press Freedom and Disclosure.  This indicates that 
companies headquartered in countries with higher (lower) levels of press freedom exhibit higher 
                                                 
24 Such studies include Bewley and Li (2000), Clarkson et al. (2008), and Magness (2006), among others. 
25 Clarkson et al. (2008) also include Tobin’s Q as a financial control variable, but, consistent with Dobler et al. 
(2015) we found this metric to be highly correlated with ROA for our sample companies.  As a sensitivity check, we 
estimated models replacing ROA with Tobin’s Q and, separately, including Tobin’s Q as an additional control.  In 
all cases, our primary test variables remain statistically significant at p < .01, one-tailed.   
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(lower) anti-corruption disclosure scores.  Table 2 also shows that two control variables, Industry 
Risk and PercWomenBrd, are positively and significantly associated with the disclosure scores, 
although the former only at the p = .064 level (two-tailed) for the parametric correlation measure. 
 
---------- Tables 1 and 2 about here ---------- 
 
 The results of our multiple regression analysis using the existence of media exposure 
variable are presented in Panel A of Table 3.  Overall the model is highly significant (based on 
the model F-statistic) and explains over 47 percent of the variation in the anti-corruption 
disclosure scores (Adjusted R2 = .473).  In support of Hypothesis 1, our media exposure variable 
is positively and significantly (at p = .004, one-tailed) related to disclosure.  Further, and 
consistent with the bivariate findings, Press Freedom remains significantly (at p = .009, one-
tailed) and positively associated with the disclosure scores.  These results thus support 
Hypothesis 2.  Finally, Panel A of Table 3 reveals that the Media*Press Freedom interaction 
variable is also positively signed and statistically significant (at p = .001, one-tailed).  This 
indicates that the existence of media exposure has more (less) impact on disclosure scores as 
country level press freedom increases (decreases), and this finding supports Hypothesis 3.  With 
respect to the control variables included in the model, both Industry Risk and PercWomenBrd 
are, as expected, positively and significantly related to differences in anti-corruption disclosure 
scores.  Firm Size and CSR Committee, while positively signed, are not significant at 
conventional levels.  A possible explanation for the lack of a firm size effect is that the sample 
consists only of the very largest multinational firms in the world, and differences in size across 
the grouping are not substantial enough to bring about visibility exposure effects.  We offer no 
explanation for the lack of a CSR Committee effect. 
 As presented in Panel B of Table 3, the results of the regression analysis using the 
extensiveness of media exposure variable are very consistent with those for the first model.  
Importantly, the media exposure metric is positively and significantly (at p = .006, one-tailed) 
related to differences in the anti-corruption disclosure scores, indicating that it is not just the 
existence, but also the level of media exposure that appears to lead to better provision of 
information on anti-corruption efforts.  As before, the Press Freedom and the Media*Press 
Freedom interaction variables are positively signed and statistically significant (both at p < .01, 
one-tailed).  As such, all three hypotheses are again supported by our analysis. 
 
---------- Table 3 about here ---------- 
 
Extended Model Results 
 
 Table 4 presents the results of the regression analyses of anti-corruption disclosure where 
VDT-based financial variables are included as additional controls.  As reflected in the table, we 
find that, while all three financial control variables are positively signed, only ROA is 
statistically significant at conventional levels.  Importantly, and consistent with the findings of 
both Guidry and Patten (2012) and Dobler et al. (2015) relative to environmental disclosure, the 
inferences on our primary variables remain unchanged with the inclusion of the additional 
controls.  The Media Exposure, Press Freedom, and Media Exposure*Press Freedom variables 
all remain positively and significantly (at p < .01, one-tailed) related to anti-corruption 
disclosure. 
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---------- Table 4 about here ---------- 
 
Country-Level Factors 
 
 In addition to company-specific factors influencing anti-corruption disclosures, it seems 
likely that differences in country-level attributes might similarly be expected to affect corporate 
attitudes toward corruption and disclosure.  In order to examine this issue, we gathered metrics 
on five different country-level factors potentially relating to anti-corruption disclosure.  The first 
three, perceptions of the degree of (1) irregular payments and bribes, (2) judicial independence, 
and (3) ethical behavior of firms, are all derived from the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 
2011-2012 report on global competitiveness (WEF, 2011).  Each of these measures is based on 
surveys of corporate executives from across the globe and for each, a higher score indicates a 
better country-level performance on that attribute.  Similarly, higher scores on our fourth 
measure, perceptions of government corruption, indicate lower levels of perceived corruption at 
the government level.  This metric is drawn from TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2011 (TI 
2011).  Finally, Simnett et al. (2009) report that CSR disclosure and assurance differ where 
countries exhibit a higher level of stakeholder as opposed to shareholder orientation (also see 
Kolk and Perego, 2010).  Accordingly, we follow Dhaliwal et al. (2012) and calculate a measure 
of country-level stakeholder orientation where more positive numbers indicate a greater 
stakeholder emphasis. 
 As reported in Table 5, each of the five country-level factors is significantly correlated 
with our press freedom measure (based on Pearson product-moment correlations), creating 
potential multicollinearity issues with respect to statistical analysis.  Accordingly, we separately 
regress the anti-corruption disclosure scores on each country-level metric (including press 
freedom) to assess the extent to which each explains variation in the disclosure (based on the 
model R2).  As also reflected in Table 5, the press freedom measure explains more of the 
variation in anti-corruption disclosure (R2 = 0.336) than any of the other country-level attributes, 
lending additional support for our arguments.26  Next, we re-estimated each of our multiple 
regression models including, separately, each of the country-level factors as an additional 
control, and in all cases the significance on our primary variables of interest – media exposure, 
press freedom, and the interaction of the two – remained statistically significant at p < .05, one-
tailed.27   
 
---------- Table 5 about here --------- 
 
Sensitivity Tests 
 
 In order to assure that our results are robust to alternative estimations, we conduct a 
number of additional sensitivity tests.  First, Healy and Serafeim (2016) argue that companies 
                                                 
26 Following Cahan et al. (1997), we also used principal components analysis to extract a common factor from the 
four country-level measures related to corruption (we exclude stakeholder orientation).  The composite factor, as 
expected, was also highly correlated with our press freedom metric.  Similar to the individual country-level factors, 
it explains less of the variation in anti-corruption disclosure (R2 = 0.214) than does press freedom. 
27 The results of the regressions including both press freedom and the various country-level factors must be 
interpreted with caution as for all of the additional variables except Stakeholder Orientation, variance inflation 
factors were in excess of 2.0. 
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listed on U.S. stock exchanges are expected to follow the guidelines of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act and as such, might be expected to have higher quality anti-corruption disclosures.  
Accordingly, we include a one/zero indicator variable where one designates companies with 
listings on U.S. stock exchanges, and results indicate no qualitative differences for the relations 
between anti-corruption disclosure scores and our primary variables.28  Because the U.K.’s 
Bribery Act became effective in 2011, we also run tests including an indicator variable coding 
both U.S. listed firms and U.K. firms and, again, results on our primary variables of interest 
continue to hold.    
Second, we conduct tests considering alternative governance factors.  In the first of these,  
we control for the potential impact of CEO duality.  Rupley et al. (2012) note that where the 
CEO simultaneously serves as the chair of the BOD, monitoring of management is reduced 
leading to increased information asymmetry potentially impacting CSR disclosure quality.  In 
separate tests including CEO duality as an additional governance factor and then in place of our 
board diversity measure we fail to find any significant relation between this governance trait and 
anti-corruption disclosures.  Further, in all cases, the results on our primary variables of interest 
continue to hold.  Next, we examined the potential impact of independent board membership.  A 
higher level of independent directors is argued to increase transparency (Kesner and Johnson, 
1990) as such members enhance the monitoring role of the board (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and 
decrease managerial discretion and opportunistic behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Gibbins et al., 1990).  Further, Rao et al. (2012) present evidence indicating higher independence 
on the BOD is associated with more extensive environmental reporting for a sample of 
Australian companies.  However, we were unable to determine independent status of BOD 
members for 12 of our sample firms, and this set of sensitivity tests relied on the reduced sample 
of 93 companies.  Using this alternative BOD measure, either in addition to, or as a replacement 
for board diversity, results on the relation between anti-corruption disclosure and our variables of 
interest remained consistent with those reported above. 
 Next, given that our sample is dominated by companies from the U.S., we estimated 
models using only the 66 observations from non-U.S. companies.  In models using, alternatively, 
the existence of media exposure and the extensiveness of media exposure, results on our 
variables of interest remained statistically significant at p < .02, one-tailed.29  Thus, the primary 
results do not appear to be driven by the U.S. companies in the sample. 
 Finally, we estimated models allowing the impacts of industry risk to vary across press 
freedom levels as well as models controlling for possible interactive effects between media 
exposure and industry risk.  In no cases were the interaction terms statistically significant, and in 
each case, the primary findings continued to hold.  Overall, we believe the results of the 
additional tests support the robustness of our primary findings. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Corporate corruption has become a major social issue, and we attempt in this study to 
provide better understanding of differences in companies’ anti-corruption disclosures.  Using 
                                                 
28 Similarly, when we code as one only those companies headquartered outside the U.S. but listed on U.S. stock 
exchanges results remain qualitatively unchanged.   
29 The results on our primary test variables also remained statistically significant (at p < .02, one-tailed) in reduced 
sample models including the VDT-based financial control variables.  In these additional estimations, the ROA 
variable was no longer statistically significant at conventional levels.   
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TI’s assessments of the anti-corruption disclosure of the 105 largest multinational firms in the 
world, we investigate in this study the role that media exposure on the issue plays with respect to 
the corporate reporting.  We find that both the existence and the extensiveness of articles in the 
world press targeting specific firms appear to lead to more extensive anti-corruption reporting.  
We also document that reduced press freedom at the home-country level is associated with less 
extensive corporate anti-corruption disclosure, and further, that lower levels of press freedom 
reduce the impact of media exposure on the disclosure of anti-corruption efforts, although it is 
important to note that a relatively small portion of our sample comes from countries ranked 
among the worst in terms of press freedom.    
 Our study makes several important contributions to the body of social and environmental 
disclosure research.  First, our investigation extends understanding of how legitimacy-related 
factors impact differences in CSR disclosure by documenting that company-level media 
exposure in the form of negative press coverage related to corruption issues appears to induce 
more extensive disclosure of anti-corruption information.  And while this finding is consistent 
with prior studies focusing on environmental or broader CSR disclosure, ours is the first to show 
that the media exposure relations appear to hold with respect to other specific types of social 
disclosure.  More importantly, no prior studies of the impact of media exposure on CSR 
disclosure examine whether the impacts vary with respect to the level of press freedom.  We 
argue that management of companies headquartered in countries where press freedom is more 
restricted will be likely to see the press as less of a source of potential social and political 
pressure, and our results are consistent with such a claim.  We concede, however, that corruption 
at the country level is a social issue specifically argued to be related to press freedom.  
Accordingly, whether lower levels of home country press freedom lead to reduced exposure 
related to environmental or other social issues is not clear and would appear to be an interesting 
extension to both our study and those prior works exploring other types of CSR disclosure.  
 Perhaps more importantly, our findings appear to have relevance related to the arguments 
of TI, Halter et al. (2009), and others regarding the role that company disclosure might play in 
reducing corruption.  On one hand, if TI’s beliefs that better anti-corruption disclosure can play a 
positive role in fostering better anti-corruption efforts at the company level, our results would 
appear to suggest that the media, by exposing concerns with companies, can aid in the anti-
corruption fight by increasing the social pressure on companies.  However, even if true, our 
results also indicate a potentially serious issue in that, in countries with reduced press freedom, 
media pressure does not appear to induce similar responses, and as such, alternative mechanisms 
for improving corporate ant-corruption disclosure (and ultimately, performance) may be 
necessary.  International investors would appear to be a major stakeholder group that could 
potentially play a role in this regard.  For example, Jung et al. (2015) note the growth in Anglo-
American institutional investment in foreign companies and document that their presence 
appeared to have impacts on company decisions in the French context.  Whether, and how, such 
external stakeholders create pressures for better disclosure on anti-corruption activities for 
countries where press freedom is more limited would be potentially enlightening. 
 Of course, it must be noted that our findings would appear to raise questions regarding 
the viability of the claims that better anti-corruption disclosure will actually lead to better 
company efforts at reducing corrupt activities. Both Everett et al. (2007) and Sikka and Lehman 
(2015) argue that current anti-corruption practices (including related accounting tools and 
controls) are not effective and remain an instrument of capitalists to create inequity and class 
struggles, and this would appear to be an issue deserving future research attention. Further, our 
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results are consistent with legitimacy theory arguments that higher levels of social and political 
pressure lead companies to use disclosure as a means of reducing their exposures.  Other 
legitimacy theory-based research, although focusing on only environmental issues, presents 
evidence that disclosure and actual firm performance may not be positively related.  For 
example, both Aerts and Cormier (2009) and Cho and Patten (2007) report that companies with 
worse environmental performance exhibited higher levels of voluntary environmental disclosure 
in their financial reports.  Further, Cho et al. (2012) document that differences in environmental 
disclosure, while significantly associated with differences in social and political exposure, were 
not related to subsequent changes in environmental performance.  As such, it seems plausible 
that company attention to anti-corruption disclosure may not carry over to better corruption 
performance.  Future research into the relation between anti-corruption disclosure and actual 
corruption performance would thus also appear to be warranted. 
 Like all studies, ours is subject to certain limitations.  Due to our data source, we examine 
only the largest, presumably most visible, multinational companies, and as such, the degree to 
which our findings generalize to other companies cannot be assessed.  Further, we rely on the 
disclosure ratings provided by TI.  Although the organization has extensive experience with 
respect to assessments of corruption issues, a review of the disclosure scheme (see Appendix A) 
reveals that the areas assessed by the organization are largely related to what Hopwood (2009) 
refers to as “programs and initiatives” as opposed to hard data on corruption activities.  We 
cannot assess how our relations might differ using an alternative disclosure scheme.  We also 
focus on only negative media exposure and its relation to disclosure.  Whether positive news 
coverage influences disclosure choice, either directly or by mitigating impacts of negative 
exposure would make an interesting extension of our analysis.  Similarly, investigating the 
degree to which changes in (as opposed to the levels of) media exposure influences the corporate 
reporting (and whether this varies across levels of press freedom) could likewise enrich 
understanding of corporate anti-corruption disclosure practices.  Finally, we measure media 
exposure based only on the presence of articles without differentiation as to the source of the 
media exposure.  We assume, given that all sample companies are large multi-national 
companies, that press coverage from any location can potentially increase firm-specific social 
pressures on the companies.  Exploring how the source of media articles (either in terms of 
geographic location or type of media) influences corporate disclosure choice would also make 
for an interesting extension of our study. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics (n = 105) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variables         Min.    Max.   Mean  Std.Dev. 
 
Disclosure         0.00 100.00    67.64    24.68 
 
Media Exposure (Categories)       0.00     3.00      0.85      0.87 
 
Press Freedom        1.00  174.00   50.35    41.99 
 
Firm Size (Mkt. Val. in US $Billion)    50.25  333.84 106.20    57.35 
 
Percent of Women on BOD       0.00      0.43     0.17      0.11 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Sample frequencies: 
 
Media Exposure – Binary (companies with at least one corruption news article) 58 (55.2%) 
 
Industry Risk (companies in high corruption risk industries)   37 (35.2%) 
 
CSR Committee (companies with a CSR committee on the board)   32 (30.5%) 
   
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Country Distribution (press freedom rankings in parentheses) 
Australia ( 30)    4   Luxembourg (  6)     1 
Belgium (  3)    1   Mexico (149)     1 
Brazil ( 99)    3   Netherlands ( 20)    2 
Canada ( 10)    2   Norway (  1)     1 
China/Hong Kong (174)  6   Russia (142)     1 
France ( 38)    8   Saudi Arabia (158)    1 
Germany ( 16)    7   South Korea ( 44)     1 
India (131)    2   Spain ( 39)      2 
Israel ( 92)    1   Switzerland (  8)    4 
Italy ( 61)    2   United Kingdom ( 28)  11 
Japan ( 22)    5   United States ( 47)   39 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 2 – Correlations (n = 105) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parametric measures (Pearson product-moment correlations) are reported above the diagonal and non-parametric measures 
(Spearman’s rho) are presented below the diagonal.  Significance levels (two-tailed) are reported in parentheses beneath the 
correlation metrics. 
  
Disclosure 
Media 
Existence 
Media 
Extent 
Press 
Freedom 
Industry 
Risk 
Firm 
Size 
CSR 
Committee 
Percent 
Women 
on BOD 
 
Disclosure 
 
1.000 
.076 
(.443) 
.088 
(.370) 
.579 
(.000) 
.181 
(.064) 
-.003 
(.977) 
.089 
(.367) 
.311 
(.001) 
Media 
Existence 
.131 
(.181) 
 
1.000 
.877 
(.000) 
-.047 
(.637) 
.143 
(.146) 
.259 
(.008) 
-.070 
(.480) 
.089 
(.366) 
Media 
Extent 
.139 
(.158) 
.922 
(.000) 
 
1.000 
.007 
(.944) 
.129 
(.189) 
.216 
(.027) 
-.122 
(.216) 
.039 
(.693) 
Press 
Freedom 
.271 
(.005) 
-.046 
(.638) 
-.008 
(.935) 
 
1.000 
-.123 
(.211) 
-.195 
(.046) 
.010 
(.923) 
.251 
(.010) 
Industry 
Risk 
.263 
(.007) 
.143 
(.146) 
 
.133 
(.175) 
-.051 
(.607) 
 
1.000 
.105 
(.285) 
 
.031 
(.751) 
-.181 
(.064) 
Firm 
Size 
.027 
(.788) 
.251 
(.010) 
.238 
(.014) 
-.244 
(.012) 
.102 
(.301) 
 
1.000 
-.084 
(.393) 
.064 
(.518) 
CSR 
Committee 
.085 
(.391) 
-.070 
(.480) 
-.121 
(.219) 
-.051 
(.606) 
.031 
(.751) 
-.042 
(.673) 
 
1.000 
.140 
(.155) 
Percent 
Women 
on BOD 
 
.276 
(.004) 
.101 
(.303) 
.072 
(.468) 
.125 
(.203) 
-.197 
(.044) 
.106 
(.284) 
.102 
(.302) 
 
1.000 
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Table 3 – Regression results for analysis of the relation between media exposure, press 
freedom, and anti-corruption disclosure. 
 
The regression model is stated as: 
 
Disclosurei = a1 + B1Media Exposurei
a + B2Press Freedomi + B3Media*Press Freedomi 
+ B4Industry Riski + B5Firm Sizei + B6CSR Committeei + B7PercWomenBrdi               
________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A – Existence of media exposure (n = 105) 
 
Adj. R2 = 0.473  F-statistic = 14.314 Significance of F-stat = .000 
 
   Predicted   Parameter    Significance 
Variable    Relation   Estimate  t-statistic of t-statisticb 
 
Constant      none     -26.569   -0.271       .787 
Media Exposure      (+)      15.404    2.747       .004 
Press Freedom      (+)        0.167    2.434       .009 
Media*Press Freedom     (+)        0.283    3.276       .001 
Industry Risk       (+)      14.054    3.695       .001 
Firm Size       (+)        3.481    0.888       .189 
CSR Committee      (+)        1.361    0.348       .364 
PercWomenBrd      (+)      52.708    3.075       .002 
 ________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel B – Level of media exposure (n = 105) 
 
Adj. R2 = 0.464  F-statistic = 13.841 Significance of F-stat = .000 
 
   Predicted   Parameter    Significance 
Variable    Relation   Estimate  t-statistic of t-statisticb 
 
Constant      none     -43.192   -0.438       .662 
Media Exposure      (+)        8.284    2.557       .006 
Press Freedom      (+)        0.204    3.207       .001 
Media*Press Freedom     (+)        0.162    2.984       .002 
Industry Risk       (+)      14.110    3.686       .001 
Firm Size       (+)        4.241    1.076       .143 
CSR Committee      (+)        1.319    0.332       .370 
PercWomenBrd      (+)      49.495    2.896       .003 
 ________________________________________________________________________ 
a For results in Panel A, Media Exposure is a binary variable where one indicates the existence of 
negative-toned media articles mentioning company i.  For results in Panel B, Media Exposure is 
a four-level categorical variable coded based on the number of negative- toned media articles 
mentioning company i.    
b Significance levels are one-tailed for directional variables. 
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Table 4 – Regression results for analysis of the relation between media exposure, press 
freedom, and anti-corruption disclosure, including financial control variables (n = 105) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
        Media    Media 
      Exposure  Exposure 
Variable     Existence    Level 
 
Constant         -15.841  -31.526  
      (-0.160)  (-0.318) 
 
Media Exposure            14.335     7.760    
        (2.593)***   (2.436)*** 
 
Press Freedom             0.175     0.211  
         (2.596)***    (3.384)*** 
 
Media*Press Freedom           0.270     0.153  
         (3.176)***   (2.868)*** 
 
Industry Risk             13.120   13.198  
         (3.255)***   (3.249)*** 
 
Firm Size               2.694     3.389  
         (0.688)   (0.863) 
 
CSR Committee              2.097     2.045   
         (0.536)   (0.514) 
 
PercWomenBrd            43.438   40.098  
         (2.522)***   (2.331)** 
 
ROA           0.636     0.644 
         (2.456)***   (2.471)*** 
 
Leverage          8.057     8.766 
         (0.749)   (0.810) 
 
Financing          1.166     0.947 
         (0.166)   (0.134) 
___ ________________________________________________________________________ 
“Media Exposure Existence” denotes model where Media Exposure is a binary variable where one indicates the 
existence of negative-toned media articles mentioning company i. “Media Exposure Level” denotes model where 
Media Exposure is a four-level categorical variable coded based on the number of negative- toned media articles 
mentioning company i.   
 
Numbers in parentheses report t-statistics, ** denotes significance at .05, *** denotes significance at .01, both one-
tailed. 
 
27 
 
Table 5 – Country-level factors, press freedom, and anti-corruption disclosure. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
          Variation 
           in Anti- 
        Correlation   Corruption 
             with   Disclosure 
Factor      Press Freedom  Explaineda 
 
Press Freedomb           ------      0.336*** 
 
Irregular Payments and Bribesc        .759***      0.121*** 
 
Judicial Independencec         .706***      0.178*** 
 
Ethical Behavior of Firmsc         .791***      0.175*** 
 
Government Corruptiond         .906***      0.265*** 
 
Stakeholder Orientatione         .333***      0.016*** 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a Based on R-squared from regression estimation of the model Disclosurei = a + b1Country-Level Factori + ei.  All 
models (based on model F-statistic) are statistically significant (at p < .001, two-tailed). 
b From RWB website (http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2011-2012,1043.html). 
c From World Economic Forum (2011). 
d From Transparency International (2011). 
e Based on Dhaliwal et al. (2012). 
 
*** denotes significance at p < .001, two-tailed. 
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Appendix A – Transparency International’s content scheme for assessment of anti-
corruption disclosures.  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Does the company have a publicly stated commitment to anti-corruption? 
 
1.0 point – if there is an explicit statement of “zero tolerance to corruption” or equivalent 
 
0.5 point – if there is no general anti-corruption statement, but only reference to public  
  sector/governmental corruption, if there is no explicit commitment, but  
  only a reference to i.e.: the US law, if there is a weak statement   
 
2. Does the company publicly commit to be in compliance with all relevant laws, including 
anti-corruption laws? 
 
1.0 point – if there is an explicit statement of such commitment for all jurisdictions in  
  which a company operates 
 
3. Does the company leadership demonstrate support for anti-corruption? E.g. is there a 
statement in a corporate citizenship report or in public pronouncements on integrity? 
 
1.0 point – if there is a relevant statement in a corporate document (i.e.: sustainability 
  report) or on company’s webpage and it includes explicit reference to 
  integrity/anti-corruption if there is a relevant statement in company’s 
  code of conduct or equivalent 
 
Note: no points awarded if there is only a letter attached to the Sustainability Report or   
  another corporate  document but it contains no reference to integrity/anti- 
  corruption 
 
4. Does the company’s code of conduct/ anti-corruption policy explicitly apply to all 
employees? 
 
1.0 point – if the policy explicitly mentions that it applies to all employees, regardless of 
  their position in corporate hierarchy, there can be no exceptions for any 
  country of operations  
 
 
5. Does the company’s code of conduct/ anti-corruption policy explicitly apply to all agents 
and other intermediaries? 
 
1.0 point – if agents must comply with the policy 
 
0.5 point – if agents are encouraged to comply with the policy 
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6. Does the company’s code of conduct/ anti-corruption policy explicitly apply to 
contractors, subcontractors and suppliers? 
 
1.0 point – if contractors/suppliers must comply with the policy, if the company screens  
  contractors/suppliers in line with such policies 
 
0.5 point – if contractors/suppliers are encouraged to comply with the policy, if the  
  company applies such policy among contractors/suppliers whenever  
  possible  
 
7. Does the company have an anti-corruption training programme for its employees in 
place? 
 
1.0 point – if there is public information that such programme is in place 
 
0.5 point – if extensive training programme is recommended (i.e.: by the programme 
  reviewers) but there is information about the current status quo  
 
8. Does the company have a policy defining appropriate/ inappropriate gifts, hospitality and 
travel expenses? 
 
1.0 point – if a company’s policy covers acceptance and offering of one or more gifts, 
  hospitality and travel expenses – the definition can be anything between  
  one sentence and vast detailed description with amounts quoted 
 
0.5 point – if only acceptance of appropriate/inappropriate gifts is defined, but no 
  offering of gifts is mentioned   
 
9. Is there a policy that explicitly forbids facilitation payments? 
 
1.0 point – if there is explicit prohibition and not only simple discouragement of such 
  payments (recognising that exceptions may be made for life or health 
  threatening situations) 
 
0.5 point – if there is a weak indirect statement, i.e.: the expression “facilitation 
payments” is not mentioned but there is a description of a similar  
situation – still, there must be explicit prohibition 
 
Note: no points awarded if such payments are only discouraged or regulated 
 
 
10. Does the company prohibit retaliation for reporting the violation of a policy? 
 
1.0 point – if the policy publicly specifies that no employee will suffer demotion, penalty  
  or other adverse consequence for reporting a violation of the policy  
  (whistle-blowing) 
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0.5 point – if company’s whistle-blowing system and all related regulations (i.e.: 
  non-retaliation) apply to senior management only (i.e.: some Chinese 
  companies have codes addressed to company’s management only)  
 
 
11. Does the company provide channels through which employees can report potential 
violations of policy or seek advice (e.g. whistleblowing) in confidence? 
 
1.0 point – if there is public provision of such a channel in a form that assures full 
   confidence 
 
0.5 point – if some “independent third party” is in place but there is no explicit statement 
   that the channel is confidential, or if the whole system applies to senior 
   management only   
 
 
12. Does the company carry out regular monitoring of its anti-corruption programme? 
 
1.0 point – if there is public information on regular monitoring of the anti-corruption 
  programme and not only on the overall audit of a sustainability report 
 
0.5 point – if there is some information on such monitoring, but no information on its 
  regularity, if there is information on monitoring of all sustainability issues 
  and additionally some implicit information that anti-corruption issues  
  should be included   
 
 
13. Does the company have a policy prohibiting political contributions or if it does make 
such contributions, are they fully disclosed? 
 
1.0 point – if a company either has a policy not to make political contributions or it  
  publicly discloses all such contributions in all its countries of operations 
 
0.5 point – if a company discloses all political contributions for its major country(-ies), 
  i.e.: for its home country (it’s often the case of the US-based companies)  
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source: Transparency in Corporate Reporting 2012 Codebook (available at 
http://files.transparency.org/content/download/469/1934/file/2012_TransparencyInCorporateRep
orting_Codebook.pdf) 
